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System Check: Balancing Texas’s Need for Natural
Resources Exploration with Texas Landowner Rights
in Light of Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury Green
Pipeline-Texas
INTRODUCTION
Oil and gas exploration in Texas is extremely important to the
state’s citizens, legislators, and the Texas economy. It is so
important that the Texas Legislature authorized the Railroad
Commission of Texas to grant common carrier status to pipeline
companies that seek to use eminent domain to appropriate private
land.1 Eminent domain refers to the power possessed by the state
over all property within the state, specifically its power to
appropriate property for a public use.2 In order for a private entity to
exercise this power, the Railroad Commission must designate the
private entity as a common carrier.3 One clear benefit of this power
is increased oil and gas production in Texas, which is good for the
Texas economy.4 While this is an ideal situation for oil and gas
companies and Texas politicians, not everyone in Texas is pleased
with the manner in which the system works.
Landowners in Texas are fighting an uphill battle against
pipeline companies they believe are abusing eminent domain, while
also fighting against the Texas Legislature, which seems intent on
allowing eminent domain to be used in a manner inconsistent with
Texas constitutional requirements. The Texas Constitution provides
that “[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed
for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being
made.”5 In order for a taking to be constitutionally valid, the taking
must be for public use;6 thus, as a corollary, no person’s property
Copyright 2014, by CAVARRIO CARTER.
1. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(a) (West 2011).
2. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (9th ed. 2009).
3. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 119.019(b) (West 2011) (setting forth
limitations of common carrier’s eminent domain power).
4. Dave Fehling, TransCanada Faces Another Legal Challenge, NPR: STATE
IMPACT (Sept. 13 2012, 6:00 AM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/09/13/key
stone-pipeline-in-texas-court-let-us-dig/ [http://perma.cc/FUL8-S5CU] (archived
Feb. 19, 2014) (quoting Tom Zabel, TransCanada’s attorney, who stated, “The
legislature came up with this scheme because they wanted to promote the
development of oil and gas in the State of Texas. . . . Texas is the largest producing
state in the nation. Why? Because the legislature has encouraged the production of
oil and gas pipelines. Because you can’t have oil and gas production without
pipelines.”).
5. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
6. See id.
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may be taken for private use.7 Yet, this is precisely what landowners
in Texas claim is happening to them regularly.8 While recent
jurisprudence has sought to rectify this problem, the Texas Supreme
Court’s efforts fail to prevent abuse of the eminent domain power
granted to common carriers.9
Further, deterrence through legislative action appears unlikely.
After considering all options, criminal sanctions remain the most
effective means of curbing pipeline companies’ participation in
eminent domain abuse.10 The problem, however, is that the current
state of the law leaves the possibility of criminal sanctions shrouded
in doubt. Fear of criminal prosecution is necessary to deter
companies that may consider engaging in eminent domain abuse. To
effect change and prevent further abuse, the entire system for
becoming a common carrier must be overhauled, especially after the
Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Texas Rice Land Partners v.
Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas.11
Part I of this Comment will discuss the relevant background of
the public use doctrine as it relates to eminent domain, as well as the
history of the oil and gas industry and eminent domain in Texas.
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief overview of recent
jurisprudence in Texas that addresses the issue of eminent domain
abuse. While recent decisions have provided landowners with hope,
these decisions also present several obstacles to combating eminent
domain abuse via criminal sanctions. Part III of this Comment will
discuss the context in which criminal liability is possible for those
who abuse the power of eminent domain and what is required for
prosecution. Of particular importance in this discussion is the Texas
Rice Land Partners decision and the problems it poses to criminal
liability and deterrence.12 Finally, Part IV will present a solution to
problems addressed throughout this Comment and will weigh the
pros and cons of both legislative and systemic changes—changes
that together may make criminal liability not only a theoretical
possibility but rather an effective, practical tool for combating
7. See id.
8. See Amanda Buffington Niles, Comment, Eminent Domain and Pipelines
in Texas: It’s as Easy as 1, 2, 3--Common Carriers, Gas Utilities, and Gas
Corporations, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 271, 271 (2010) (addressing the
frequency of landowners’ interaction with pipeline companies in context of eminent
domain abuse).
9. See infra Part II (discussing Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury
Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. 2012), reh’g denied, 381
S.W.3d 465 (Tex. 2012)).
10. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.46 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013)
(providing the means for addressing eminent domain abuse).
11. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d 192.
12. See generally id.
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eminent domain abuse to preserve the balance between natural
resources exploration and private landowner rights.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Scope of the Public Use Doctrine
Throughout the history of the United States, state governments,
along with a limited number of private entities, have exercised the
power of eminent domain in order to take land for public use.13
What constitutes public use has long been the subject of debate.14
The dispute over this seemingly self-evident standard has led to
decades of jurisprudence attempting to spell out precisely the
meaning of “public use”.15 Generally, there are two widely accepted
standards for interpreting the public use requirement: the “use by the
public” test and the “public benefit” test.16 The use by the public test
reflects a narrow interpretation of the public use requirement and
holds that public use means any legitimate public purpose or public
advantage.17 Examples of use under the public standard may include
public ownership or public access.18 The second and broader
standard, the public benefit test, includes use for the purposes of
eliminating blight, redistributing concentrated land, and promoting
economic development.19
Although the public benefit standard is considered by many to
be the more appropriate standard for evaluating what constitutes
public use, the federal government has declined to declare a general

13. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
14. Compare Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (“[For example, A] law
that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for
a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers . . . .”), with Beekman v.
Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y. Ch. 1831) (“[I]f the
public interest can be in any way promoted by the taking of private property, it
must rest in the wisdom of the legislature . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005),
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W. 2d
765, 769–70 (Mich. 2004); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
16. 2A-7 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.02[2]-[3] (Julius L. Sackman
ed., 3d ed. 2003) (noting two definitions of “public use”—a “broad” and a
“narrow” definition—“each of which has its ardent supporters among legal
scholars and courts”). Interpretations of the public use requirement are not limited
to these two viewpoints.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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public use standard.20 One reason for refusing to declare a general
standard is that the meaning of “public use” might vary considerably
from region to region; thus, it is more appropriate that the meaning
“public use” be left for the states to define.21 Beginning in the
twentieth century, however, there has been a push for the broader
view.22 An illustration of how the public use doctrine has been
interpreted provides a better understanding of the difficulty
surrounding application of the doctrine.
1. Expanding the Public Use Doctrine
Both state and federal courts have implemented a series of
varying interpretations, which have in turn favored both broad and
narrow public use definitions; for many years, this failure to settle
on a definition complicated the public use doctrine.23 In Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, the City of Detroit used its
power of eminent domain to condemn an entire neighborhood for
the construction of a new General Motors manufacturing plant.24
The affected homeowners argued that the takings were
unconstitutional because the direct and primary beneficiary of the
taking was General Motors; thus, the taking would have been for an
impermissible private use.25 The Michigan Supreme Court,
however, upheld the condemnations by concluding that “public use”
20. See United States v. Certain Lands in Louisville, 78 F.2d 684, 686–87
(6th Cir. 1935), cert. granted, 296 U.S. 567 (1935), cert. dismissed, 297 U.S. 726
(1936) (“[The] term ‘public use,’ . . . is not susceptible of precise definition under
the Supreme Court decisions.”); State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov’t of
Wyandotte Cnty./Kansas City, Kan., 962 P.2d 543, 553 (Kan. 1998) (“There is no
precise definition of what constitutes a valid public use . . . .”); Smith v. Cameron,
210 P. 716, 720 (Or. 1922) (“[It is] difficult, and probably impossible, to frame
such a definition of the term ‘public use’ . . . .”); Miller v. City of Tacoma, 378
P.2d 464, 470 (Wash. 1963) (“[T]he words ‘public use’ are neither abstractly nor
historically capable of complete definition.”).
21. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (stating that
“legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by
an exercise of the taking power.”).
22. See infra Part I.A.1. (discussing the expansion of the “public use”
doctrine).
23. Daniel B. Kelly, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A
Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 2–3 (2006).
24. 2A-7 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.06[7][c][iv] (Julius L. Sackman
ed., 3d ed. 2003) (tabulating that “[o]ver 465 acres, 3,500 people, and 1,176
buildings, including 144 businesses, 3 schools, 16 churches, and 1 cemetery, were
taken by the City of Detroit for a cost exceeding $200 million in order to provide
land for a new General Motors facility.”).
25. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458
(Mich. 1981).
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and “public purpose” could be used interchangeably.26 The
Michigan Supreme Court concluded that, “even though a private
party will also, ultimately, receive a benefit,” a municipality’s use of
eminent domain to alleviate unemployment and revitalize the local
economy constitutes two “essential public purposes.”27
The Poletown decision resulted in many states interpreting their
constitutions in a similar manner.28 States that chose to equate
public use with public purpose created a situation in which almost
any reasonable justification could be made for taking private
property.29 Even if a use was inherently private and a private party
received the primary benefit, the taking could be justified.30
Recognizing that the state of the public use doctrine left private
landowners without a reliable standard, the Michigan Supreme
Court in County of Wayne v. Hathcock unanimously overruled its
prior decision in Poletown, holding that promoting economic
development does not constitute a legitimate public use under the
Michigan constitution.31 The decision in County of Wayne indicated
a move towards a more restrictive interpretation of the public use
doctrine. However, the move toward a narrow public use definition
would not last long because the United States Supreme Court’s
ruling in Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut was soon to
change how the public use doctrine would be applied for years to
come.32

26. See id. at 457 (“We are persuaded the terms have been used
interchangeably in Michigan statutes and decisions in an effort to describe the
protean concept of public benefit. The term ‘public use’ has not received a narrow
or inelastic definition by this Court in prior cases.”).
27. Id. at 459.
28. See, e.g., City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, Inc., 552 N.W.2d
365, 369, 372–74 (N.D. 1996) (relying on Poletown to conclude that “the
stimulation of commercial growth and removal of economic stagnation . . . are
objectives satisfying the public use and purpose requirement of N.D. Const. Art. I,
§ 16”). See also City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn. 1986)
(citing Poletown and concluding that “revitalization of deteriorating urban areas
and the alleviation of unemployment are certainly public goals”).
29. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (1982) (“The arguments deployed [in
Poletown] in support of the publicness of this venture could be deployed in
support of virtually any venture one can imagine.”).
30. See Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 769–70, 786 (Mich.
2004) (stating that Poletown’s “economic benefit” rationale would “validate
practically any exercise of the power of eminent domain on behalf of a private
entity” because “[e]very business, every productive unit in society does . . .
contribute in some way to the commonwealth”).
31. Id. at 788.
32. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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In Kelo, the United States Supreme Court again expanded the
public use definition,33 holding that promoting economic
development does constitute a legitimate public use under the
federal constitution.34 In that case, New London granted the power
of eminent domain to a private economic development corporation
charged with revitalizing the downtown and waterfront areas of the
city.35 The development corporation decided to remove existing
homes and small businesses and replace them with privately-owned
office buildings and a riverfront hotel, all of which would
complement a new Pfizer global research facility.36 However, nine
property owners refused to sell, and the development corporation
resorted to the use of eminent domain to take title to the land.37 City
authorities argued that the condemnations were justified because the
city had experienced significant economic decline and was
designated a “distressed municipality” in 1990.38
In the Court’s 5-to-4 decision, Justice Kennedy concurred with
the explanation that, even though he agreed with the majority in the
outcome, his opinion was that the majority did not “foreclose the
possibility that a more stringent standard of review . . . might be
appropriate” for private transfers with a higher “risk of undetected
impermissible favoritism of private parties.”39 In two dissenting
opinions, Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas argued that, under
the majority’s interpretation of the Public Use Clause, almost any
private property was now vulnerable to the government’s use of
eminent domain for a more productive private use.40 Justice Thomas
33. See Karen C. Fagelson & J. Phillip London, Jr., Kelo: What Lies Ahead for
Public Use Outside Blighted Areas, BULLETIN (REED SMITH) (2005), http://www
.reedsmith.com/Kelo--What-Lies-Ahead-for-Public-Use-Outside-Blight ed-Areas08-09-2005/ [http://perma.cc/TBT-4MCU] (archived Feb. 24, 2014) (stating “Kelo
went beyond any previous definition. In Berman v. Parker, the court expanded the
public use definition from only allowing the taking of blighted property to permitting
taking of private property in a blighted area. Now in Kelo, the court is permitting
private taking of property that is not blighted or in a blighted area.”) (citation
omitted).
34. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 470.
35. Id. at 474–75.
36. Id. at 474.
37. See id. at 475.
38. See id. at 473.
39. Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
40. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Under the banner
of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken
and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded—i.e.,
given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more
beneficial to the public—in the process.”); id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“If
such ‘economic development’ takings are for a ‘public use,’ any taking is, and the
Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution . . . .”).
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further argued that the majority decision was not well-grounded in
precedent.41 While the majority defended its holding by asserting
that, under its interpretation, the Public Use Clause retained
meaning,42 the Court failed to provide any clear standard for
defining public use or distinguishing between public and private
uses.43
2. The Response to Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut
The Court’s ruling in Kelo is widely believed to have opened the
door for the use of eminent domain for private purposes.44
Landowners were unnerved by the decision, and several states took
legislative action in an effort to strengthen landowner rights.45 One
state was Texas.46 Although Texas acted swiftly in an attempt to
curtail eminent domain abuse following the holding in Kelo, the
resulting legislation was nevertheless incomplete.47
Texas’s new laws included restrictions that prohibited a
government or private entity from taking property if the taking did
any of the following: (1) conferred a private benefit, (2) was
pretextual, or (3) was for economic development.48 The legislation
made the exercise of eminent domain permissible for economic
development, but only if the exercise was secondary to the main
objective of eliminating blight.49 The legislation was expected to
41. See id. at 515 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s
application of Berman and Midkiff is “further proof that the ‘public purpose’
standard is not susceptible of principled application”).
42. See id. at 486–87 (noting that “transferring citizen A’s property to citizen
B for the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use
and thus pay more taxes . . . would certainly raise a suspicion that a private
purpose was afoot”).
43. Id. at 487 (arguing that “the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can
be confronted if and when they arise” and “do not warrant the crafting of an
artificial restriction on the concept of public use”); see also id. at n.19 (noting that
“[a] parade of horribles is especially unpersuasive in this context, since the
Takings Clause largely ‘operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the
government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge’”) (quoting East.
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
and dissenting in part)).
44. See generally Kennedy, supra note 29.
45. See, e.g., 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform
Legislation since Kelo (Texas), CASTLE COALITION, http://castlecoalition.org
/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1372&Itemid=129 [http://perma
.cc/Z2V3-5Y2J] (archived Feb. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Coalition Report].
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. See id.

316

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 2

prevent eminent domain abuse in Texas, but the results have been
somewhat dissatisfying.50
The new legislation also included exceptions to the prohibitions
so that they do not apply to utilities, port authorities, or other
specific agencies and projects.51 One such exception included the
new Dallas Cowboys stadium.52 In 2007, the Texas Legislature
passed a bill which would have specified that condemnation only
qualifies as public use when it “allows the state, a political
subdivision of the state, or the general public of the state to possess,
occupy, and enjoy the property.”53 The bill would have provided
even greater protection against common eminent domain abuse
tactics; however, Governor Rick Perry vetoed the bill.54
B. Eminent Domain in Texas: A Brief Overview
Our brief history of eminent domain legislation in Texas begins
with a statute enacted during the 1895 regular session.55 Landowners
first challenged the law as unconstitutional in a suit against an
irrigation company that acquired a right of way over the owners’
land for an irrigation canal.56 The statute provided in part:
[A]ll corporations and associations formed for the purpose of
irrigation, mining, milling, the construction of waterworks
for cities and towns, and stockraising as provided in this
chapter, shall have right of way over public lands, and that
such corporation or association of persons, as well as cities
and towns, may obtain the right of way over private property
and water belonging to riparian owners by condemnation as
provided in the case of railroads.57
Since the plaintiffs believed the irrigation company was not
seeking to take the land for a public purpose, the plaintiffs argued
that the statute was unconstitutional.58 The plaintiffs also argued that
the law authorized the creation of “purely private corporations” for
the operation of wholly private businesses and did not secure any

50. See id.
51. Coalition Report, supra note 45.
52. Id.
53. H.B. 2006, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007).
54. Id.
55. 1895 Tex. Rev. Civ. St. 3115–3131.
56. Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 86 S.W. 11, 11–12 (Tex.
1905), aff’d 204 U.S. 667 (1907).
57. 1895 Tex. Rev. Civ. St. 3115–3131.
58. Borden, 86 S.W. at 14.
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such use to the public.59 Siding with the irrigation company, the
Texas Supreme Court reasoned that the corporation was transferring
water to the public and that “the courts cannot inquire into the
wisdom or expediency of the regulations adopted by the legislature
for the protection of the public.”60 This tradition of categorizing
projects that promote private enterprise as public use continues in
Texas and plays a major role in the discussion of common carrier
status and landowner rights.
1. Texas Law Today
Legislative bodies may delegate the power to determine whether
a certain entity will be able to exercise eminent domain or whether
that entity is one to which the power of eminent domain may be
granted.61 In Texas, corporations or companies deemed to be
common carriers may exercise the power of eminent domain. The
authority to grant such a power has been given to the Texas Railroad
Commission (TRC).62 Throughout the years, critics have disparaged
the decisions made by the TRC regarding the designation of
companies as common carriers.63
There are three primary designations that a corporation may seek
in order to obtain the right to exercise eminent domain.64 The first of
these designations is common carrier status. The Texas Natural
Resources Code provides, among others, the following possibilities
for the common carrier designation: (1) owning, operating, or
managing a pipeline for the transportation of crude petroleum to or
for the public for hire, or engaging in the business of transporting
crude petroleum by pipeline; or (2) owning, operating, or managing
59. Id.
60. Id. at 14–15.
61. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (West 2008 & Supp.
2013).
62. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(b) (West 2011).
63. See, e.g., Terri Hall, Property rights activists seek clarity on eminent
domain use by private entities, EXAMINER.COM (July 24, 2012), http://www
.examiner.com/article/property-rights-advocates-seek-clarity-on-eminent-domainuse-by-private-pipeline [http://perma.cc/4US3-NUTP] (archived Feb. 25, 2014)
(quoting several individuals who express disapproval of the common carrier
process in Texas); see also Niles, supra note 8 at 291–93 (suggesting stricter
requirements for designation as a common carrier should be implemented); Saul
Elbein, Pipeline Companies Seize Land in Texas at Will, TEXASOBSERVER.ORG
(Aug. 22, 2012, 5:34), http://www.texasobserver.org/pipeline-companies-seizeland-in-texas-at-will/ [http://perma.cc/SK9V-E2J3] (archived Mar. 16, 2014)
(discussing concern regarding T-4 application process and significant power given
to pipeline companies during process).
64. Id. at 280.
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pipelines for the transportation of carbon dioxide or hydrogen in any
form.65 Texas courts have attempted to arrive at more precise
definitions than the Natural Resources Code offers but have come
up short in fashioning a standard that clearly determines common
carrier status.66
When a corporation or private entity seeks a designation as a
common carrier, it must fill out a T-4 application and file the
application with the TRC.67 The T-4 application consists of various
questions that seek to determine whether a company will, in fact, be
operating as a common carrier.68 When a corporation files with the
TRC, it asserts that the information provided on the form is correct
to the best of its knowledge.69 For many years, Texas courts did not
make the determination of whether a company was a common
carrier.70 By filing with the TRC, a pipeline company was able to
bypass the courthouse’s determination71 because a TRC application
constituted an acceptance that the company would be governed by
the TRC’s provisions.72 Courts simply performed a cursory check to
establish that it was actually designated as a common carrier once
the pipeline company filled out the appropriate paperwork.73
Essentially, the process developed as follows: (1) a company
would fill out the T-4 application; (2) the TRC would approve the
application as long as the company agreed to be bound by the TRC’s
provisions; (3) the company would receive common carrier
designation; and (4) the court would simply make sure that the
company was actually approved by the TRC.74 Determining whether
the pipeline company was truly a common carrier as required by the
public use clause of the appropriate provision of the Natural

65. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.002 (West 2011).
66. See Niles, supra note 8, at 281.
67. See Pipeline Eminent Doman and Condemnation Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs), RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS, http://www.rrc.state.tx.us
/about/faqs/eminentdomain.php [http://perma.cc/L6QZ-WA8G] (archived Feb. 24,
2014).
68. See Niles, supra note 8, at 282–83.
69. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.143 (West 2011) (listing penalties
for providing fraudulent information during application process).
70. Niles, supra note 8, at 282. At the time the Niles article was written,
Texas Rice Land Partners v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas had not yet been
decided. As will be discussed later, Texas Rice Land Partners altered the review
process.
71. See id. at 282.
72. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.131 (West 2011).
73. Niles, supra note 8, at 283.
74. See supra Part I.B. (providing extensive discussion of the history of the
procedure for obtaining common carrier designation).
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Resources Code was apparently beyond the scope of the courts’
duties.75
Once a pipeline company subjected itself to the TRC as a
common carrier, the pipeline company received, in effect, the
“unreviewable authority to condemn land.”76 In addition, the
qualifications for designation as a common carrier have, arguably,
been set extremely low77 by the TRC,78 and courts have generally
given extreme deference to the TRC’s designation of a company as
a common carrier.
C. Free Reign: Lack of Accountability for Eminent Domain Abuse
With the right to eminent domain being fairly easy to obtain in
Texas, such that landowners’ property could be taken based on the
presumed integrity of pipeline companies, one might ask why more
has not been done to curb eminent domain abuse. The answer may
lie in the significant impact that not allowing these companies to
exercise eminent domain would have on the Texas economy. It is
important to review the history of the oil and gas industry in Texas
in order to illustrate this point properly.
1. The Oil and Gas Industry in Texas and Political Influence
During the oil boom in the early 1900s, the need to transport the
products of oil wells increased dramatically in Texas.79 As a result,
the legislature declared pipeline companies to be common carriers
and then granted these companies the right of eminent domain.80
Throughout the years that followed, Texas passed legislation
furthering the development of the state’s natural resources at the
expense of landowners, including granting private companies the
right of eminent domain for activities such as irrigation, mining, and
75. See Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 86 S.W. 11, 14 (Tex.
1905), aff'd, 204 U.S. 667 (1907).
76. Niles, supra note 8, at 284 (discussing results of prior jurisprudence
interpreting courts’ ability to review common carrier decision of TRC).
77. As discussed throughout this Comment, the current process by which the
TRC grants common carrier status has recently been cast into doubt by
landowners and scholars alike, with emphasis being placed on both the ease of
qualification and the lack of review by any judicial authority.
78. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 111.020(d) (West 2011) (noting that the mere
acceptance of the TRC’s common carrier provisions can provide a company with
common carrier status).
79. Niles, supra note 8, at 277.
80. Humble Pipe Line Co. v. State, 2 S.W.2d 1018, 1019 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928).
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stock raising.81 The oil and gas industry was added to the list of
beneficiaries of eminent domain powers when pipeline companies
were granted this power by the legislature.82
The Texas Supreme Court has historically sided with the oil and
gas companies, adopting an admittedly broad view of what
constitutes public use.83 In Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v.
Pate, the Texas Supreme Court stated that the test for determining
public use is to determine whether there “results to the public some
definite right or use in the business or undertaking to which the
property is devoted.”84 Furthering this pro-oil approach to the
doctrine, courts have also declared that “[i]t is immaterial if the use
is limited to the citizens of a local neighborhood, or that the number
of citizens likely to avail themselves of it is inconsiderable, so long
as it is open to all who choose to avail themselves of it.”85 A use will
not be deprived of its public character simply because it is
advantageous to a particular group or individual.86
Texas courts have also made it clear that the legislature’s
declaration (that a use is public) “is binding on the court unless it is
manifestly wrong or unreasonable, or the purpose for which the
declaration is enacted is ‘clearly and probably private.’”87 Further,
the right to eminent domain grows out of necessity.88 While this
statement likely has merit, there is little question that the
legislature’s discretion in choosing to which entities to grant
eminent domain power, coupled with the court’s liberal definition of
public use, has made landowners the losing party in many battles
against private entities over the use of eminent domain.89

81. Niles, supra note 8, at 278.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Pate, 309 S.W.2d 828, at
832–33 (Tex. 1958) (affirming trial court judgment in favor of Coastal States Gas
Producing Co., which ruled that Coastal States Gas had the right to condemn land
for the purpose of drilling a directional well). See also id. at 833 (stating “[the
Texas Supreme Court] has adopted a rather liberal view as to what is or is not a
public use”).
84. Id. at 833.
85. Tenngasco Gas Gathering Co. v. Fischer, 653 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1983) (quoting West v. Whitehead, 238 S.W. 976, 978 (Tex. Civ. App.
1922)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Imperial Irrigation Co. v. Jayne, 138 S.W. 575, 587 (Tex. 1911).
89. Niles, supra note 8, at 279.
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2. Landowners Are At a Significant Disadvantage
While political power and judicial interpretations of public use
may have contributed to Texas landowners’ plight, other factors also
affect their ability to fight back against private entities that they
believe are abusing the power of eminent domain. These factors
include legal and financial constraints, as well as the lack of
mobilization among affected landowners. Some believe that the use
of eminent domain should be discouraged due to the increase of
inordinate private influence and corruption within the eminent
domain process.90 Add political alignment with private entities and
it becomes very clear why landowners are discouraged from
challenging these companies.
Private parties that would directly benefit from takings have a
strong incentive to influence the eminent domain process for their
own private advantage,91 often resulting in “socially undesirable
transfers.”92 In a taking for private benefit, “the single beneficiary . .
. has a powerful incentive to capture a concentrated benefit.”93 On
the other hand, a taking for general public benefit usually involves
multiple beneficiaries.94 Takings primarily for the general public
also help to ensure the absence of inordinate influence during the
takings process.95 As a result, the potential for corruption is higher
in a taking for a private party than in a taking for the government or
public.
Private parties are able to use excessive influence to singlehandedly benefit from a taking, so many landowners will be affected
by the taking; yet, the effects experienced by each individual
landowner as a result of the taking may be minor.96 As a result, the
incentive to oppose the taking may be relatively weak.97 Projects
that involve multiple owners (as most projects do) also create a
coordination problem.98 Private parties are capable of using eminent

90. See Kelly, supra note 23, at 34.
91. See id. at 23.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
223, 229 (1986) (“Pre-existing coalitions and groups of allied individuals will be
more effective than dispersed individuals in obtaining transfers of wealth from
society as a whole to themselves.”).
96. Kelly, supra note 23, at 35.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 23–24.
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domain to exploit these bargaining problems among the dispersed
owners.99
Owners are also at a significant disadvantage when it comes to
challenging eminent domain abuse due to relatively ineffective
political checks against the subversive use of eminent domain. As
previously discussed, there are many reasons why political influence
will side with private entities.100 First, the period of time that elapses
between the time of the condemnation and the time at which the
consequences of the condemnation become known results in the
diminishment of political accountability.101 This is because the
members of the legislature, who were instrumental in the
condemnation proceedings, may not be the same members present
in the legislature at the time the consequences of the condemnations
become known. Also, private parties that exercise eminent domain
are typically heavily involved in legislative proceedings and,
therefore, regularly have the opportunity to influence legislation.102
One benefit of being regularly involved in the legislative process is
the enjoyment of a substantial advantage in the political process.103
Because of this advantage, the political process will usually be
unable to compensate for the inordinate influence private parties
exert in seeking the condemnation authority for their own
advantage.104
II. A GOOD FAITH EFFORT: TEXAS RICE LAND PARTNERS, LTD. V.
DENBURY GREEN-TEXAS, LLC
The issue in Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury GreenTexas began when Denbury Green applied to the Texas Railroad
99. Id. at 35–37.
100. See supra Part I.C.1. (discussing oil and gas significance to the Texas
economy as reason for political alliance with oil and gas companies).
101. Id.
102. See Kelly, supra note 23, at 36; see also Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use”
and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 82 (1998) (“[T]he special interest is likely to have more
political influence, because unlike the landowner, the interest group is probably a
repeat player in the political process and thereby able to offer more to
legislators.”).
103. See Kochan, supra note 102, at 81–83 (discussing interest-group theory of
legislation and the role of repeat players in the political process).
104. See James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on
Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1309 n.187 (1985) (noting the
“inefficient takings that result from the weakness of the political check on the use
of eminent domain: the corruption, unfairness, or mistakes of elected officials and
the electorate’s failure to effectively or fairly review the actions of its
representatives”).
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Commission for a permit to operate a carbon dioxide pipeline that
would carry carbon dioxide from a field in Mississippi to various oil
fields in Brazoria and Galveston County.105 When Denbury Green
filled out the T-4 application,106 it noted that it would operate as a
“common carrier” rather than as a “private line.”107 The company
indicated that it would transport carbon dioxide owned by others and
that this carbon dioxide would be transported for a fee.108 The
company also sent a letter to the TRC stating that it would accept the
provisions of Chapter 111 of the Natural Resources Code, which
defines the requirements for achieving common carrier status and
also imposes requirements on the operations of a common carrier
pipeline.109 The TRC issued a permit for the transportation of carbon
dioxide through a common carrier pipeline eight days later.110 The
common carrier status conferred the power of eminent domain upon
Denbury.111
Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. owned the property where
Denbury intended to place its pipeline, and when Denbury attempted
to survey the land for the purpose of either purchasing or
condemning a portion of the surface estate for pipeline right-of-way
purposes, Texas Rice denied entry.112 Denbury sought an injunction
to prevent Texas Rice’s interference.113 The trial court found
Denbury was a common carrier, and therefore, it had the power of
eminent domain.114
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding
the following: (1) the determination of whether a pipeline company
is a common carrier is a question of law;115 and (2) substantial
105. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC,
363 S.W.3d 192, 195 (Tex. 2012), reh’g denied, 381 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. 2012).
106. See supra Part I.B.1. (discussing T-4 application).
107. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 195–96.
108. Id. at 196.
109. Id.; see also TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 111.002(6), 111.011–111.025
(West 2011); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 111.020(d) (West 2011) (stating that
acceptance of the provision of the Natural Resources Code is a requirement for
gaining common carrier status).
110. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 196.
111. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(a).
112. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 196.
113. See id.
114. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.019(a); Texas Rice Land Partners,
Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 296 S.W.3d 878 (Texas Ct. App.
2009) (stating that “[t]he trial court found that Denbury Green proved as a matter
of law that Denbury Green ‘is a common carrier’”), rev’d, 383 S.W.3d 192 (Tex.
2012).
115. Texas Rice Land Partners, 296 S.W.3d at 879 (citing Vardeman v.
Mustang Pipeline Co., 51 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001)).
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deference is to be given to TRC decisions in areas of its expertise.116
In his dissent, Justice Gaultney rejected the notion that checking the
boxes and filling out the T-4 form was sufficient for designation as a
common carrier.117 He reasoned that the record supported a finding
that the pipeline would be used by Denbury solely to transport its
own carbon dioxide.118 As a result of this evidence, there were
unresolved factual questions about whether the common carrier
decision was consistent with the constitutional requirement that
prohibits the taking of private property for private, not public, use.119
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with Justice Gaultney. In the
court’s revised opinion, the court stated the Natural Resources Code
requires “so-called ‘common carrier’ pipeline companies to
transport carbon dioxide ‘to or for the public for hire.’”120 Holding
that “[u]nadorned assertions of public use are constitutionally
insufficient,” the court overruled the court of appeals and found that
(1) a pipeline owner does not obtain the right to condemn private
property by merely checking the correct boxes on the T-4
application filed with the TRC; and (2) a landowner can challenge in
court whether the proposed pipeline is truly public.121
The court decided that the T-4 permit alone was not enough to
designate Denbury as a common carrier; therefore, Denbury did not
have the power of eminent domain.122 Since the mere declaration of
a company as a common carrier was held to be insufficient, the
court articulated a standard for determining whether a company
qualified as a common carrier.123 The court declared that the
“pipeline must serve the public; it cannot be built only for the
builder’s exclusive use.”124 Rejecting Denbury’s claim, the court
held that merely making the pipeline available for public use was
insufficient to confer common carrier status.125
Two reasons were offered for the rejection of Denbury’s claim.
First, the court stated that Denbury’s claim was inconsistent with the
wording of Section 111.002(6) of the Natural Resources Code; in
116. See id.
117. See id. at 881–83 (Gaultney, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 881–82.
119. See id. at 883 (citing Maher v. Lasater, 354 S.W.2d 923, 924–25 (Tex.
1962)); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17(a).
120. Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC,
363 S.W.3d 192, 195 (Tex. 2012), reh’g denied, 381 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. 2012); see
also TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.002(6) (West 2011).
121. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 195.
122. Id. at 198.
123. See id. at 200.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 201 (reversing appeals’ court judgment holding that making pipeline
available for public use is sufficient to confer common carrier status).
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addition, Denbury’s proposed reading would confer common carrier
status and eminent domain power even when the pipeline will never
serve the public by transporting carbon dioxide “to or for the public
for hire.”126 Second, under Denbury Green’s proposed reading of the
statute, a company could acquire property through the use of
eminent domain even when the company knows that no party other
than itself will ever desire to use the pipeline.127 Ultimately, the
court found that, in order for a company to qualify as a common
carrier, a “reasonable probability must exist that the pipeline will at
some point after construction serve the public by transporting gas
for one or more customers who will either retain ownership of their
gas or sell it to parties other than the carrier.”128 The evidence
presented by Denbury was deemed to be insufficient to establish a
reasonable probability that such transportation would ever occur.129
A. The Texas Rice Land Partners Decision: A Closer Look
The Texas Rice Land Partners decision expressly overruled a
longstanding tradition in Texas that granted great deference to the
decisions of the Texas Legislature and the TRC.130 In doing so,
Texas landowners were granted a new power: the power to
challenge the decisions of the TRC.131 Even with the ability to
challenge TRC common carrier determinations, for reasons
previously discussed, landowners are still unlikely to challenge the
TRC’s rulings.132 However, even if landowners were to overcome
the barriers that currently limit their ability to challenge a
company’s common carrier status, the Texas Rice Land Partners
decision presents several new obstacles.
1. The Difficulties Presented by the Texas Rice Land Partners
Decision
One of the primary reasons the Texas Rice Land Partners court
was able to make its factual determination regarding Denbury’s
common carrier status—that Denbury Green’s pipeline would in
fact operate as a private pipeline, only carrying Denbury Green’s
carbon dioxide—was that Denbury operated a website which
126. Id.
127. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 202.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 203.
130. See id. at 198–99; see also supra Part I.B.1.
131. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 198–99.
132. See supra Part I.C.2. (discussing various factors that affect landowners’
challenges).
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provided evidence contrary to that provided on its T-4
application.133 Several portions of the company’s website indicated
that it would be exclusively for private use.134 One statement on the
website read:
We see these sources as a possible expansion of our natural
Jackson Dome source, . . . and we believe that our potential
ability to tie these sources together with pipelines will give
us a significant advantage over our competitors, in our
geographic area, in acquiring additional oil fields and these
future potential man-made sources of CO2.135
While the court used this statement (and similar statements) as
evidence that Denbury intended to operate a private pipeline, it is
unlikely that this evidence will exist in many future cases.136
Pipeline companies that apply for common carrier status after the
Denbury decision are likely to avoid the use of such incriminating
statements on websites, or anywhere else.137 Without such
statements to use as evidence, it will be difficult to prove that a
company never intends to operate as a public pipeline.138 This will,
undoubtedly, make landowners’ task even more difficult should they
choose to challenge a TRC decision.
Another problem with the Texas Rice Land Partners decision is
the inherent difficulty in disproving that there is a “reasonable
probability . . . that the pipeline will at some point after construction
serve the public.”139 As previously mentioned, it would be difficult
for landowners to prove that the company intends to operate the
pipeline privately in the absence of a company expressly stating so
on its website or another public forum. If a company does not
provide such information, proving its intent becomes a more
difficult task. Not only is reasonable certainty a rather unclear
standard, but the court in Texas Rice Land Partners also failed to set
forth a requirement that pipeline companies must present certain
133. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 203.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Since the court in Texas Rice Land Partners made it apparent that such
statements will be used as proof of intent to operate as a private pipeline, it is
unlikely that any company applying for common carrier status will deliberately
place such statements on its website since proof of intent to operate as a private
pipeline will work to defeat an application for common carrier status.
137. See Proving Common-Carrier Status After Denbury, JONES WALKER
(Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.joneswalker.com/news-publications-783.html [http:
//perma.cc/6FCR-62VY] (archived Feb. 25, 2014) (discussing practices to avoid
during common carrier process in light of the Texas Rice Land Partners decision).
138. See id.
139. Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 202.
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evidence clearly indicating the company’s intent to operate its
pipeline “to or for the public for hire.”140
III. THE CHALLENGE WITH DETERRING EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE IN
THE PIPELINE ARENA
Texas landowners and activists have alleged eminent domain
abuse in the pipeline industry for quite some time.141 After much
public outcry, the Texas Rice Land Partners decision’s standard for
challenging a company’s common carrier status has opened the door
for discussion of criminal liability. If a pipeline company falsifies
documents during the application process, it is a felony offense.142
However, a reading of criminal statutes providing for liability for
fraud in conjunction with the Texas Rice Land Partners standard
demonstrates that holding pipeline companies criminally liable for
fraud is more difficult than ordinarily believed.
In Texas, when a court is faced with the issue of how to construe
a statute, the court looks first to its literal text.143 When examining
the literal text, courts will “read words and phrases in context and
construe them according to the rules of grammar and usage.”144 If
the statutory language is ambiguous, or leads to absurd results that
the Texas Legislature could not have possibly intended, then courts
may look outside the wording of the statute to ascertain the
legislative intent.145
The Texas Penal Code defines various acts that constitute fraud,
one of which is the act of securing the execution of a document by
deception.146 The statute begins by stating, “A person commits an
offense if, with intent to defraud or harm any person, he, by
deception . . . causes another to sign or execute any document
affecting property or service or the pecuniary interest of any
person.”147 The degree of punishment for the offense is
proportionate to the value of the affected property, service, or
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., Terri Hall, Property rights activists seek clarity on eminent
domain use by private entities, EXAMINER.COM (July 24, 2012), http://www
.examiner.com/article/property-rights-advocates-seek-clarity-on-eminent-domainuse-by-private-pipeline [http://perma.cc/4US3-NUTP] (archived Feb. 25, 2014)
(noting comments from several activists who argue that certain instances of
eminent domain use by pipeline companies is unconstitutional).
142. Id.
143. Jones v. State, 323 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lopez v. State, 253 S.W.3d
680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
145. Id. (citing Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
146. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.46 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).
147. Id. at § 32.46(a)(1).
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pecuniary interest.148 That is, the punishment imposed will increase
as the value of the affected property, service, or pecuniary interest
increases.149
For the purpose of prosecuting criminal offenses under Section
32.46 of the Texas Penal Code (Securing Execution of a Document
by Deception), deception is defined as follows:
(A) [C]reating or confirming by words or conduct a false
impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment
of another in the transaction . . . (B) failing to correct a false
impression of law or fact that is likely to affect the judgment
of another in the transaction, that the actor previously
created or confirmed by words or conduct, and that the actor
does not now believe to be true; (C) preventing another from
acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the
transaction; (D) selling or otherwise transferring or
encumbering property without disclosing a lien, security
interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the
enjoyment of property, whether the lien, security interest,
claim, or impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a
matter of official record; or (E) promising performance that
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction
and that the actor does not intend to perform or knows will
not be performed, expect that failure to perform the promise
in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not
sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or
knew the promise would not be performed.150
Given the above definition, an element of fraud that might be at
issue in eminent domain abuse is deception.
While the Texas Rice Land Partners decision was rendered with
the best intentions, the ruling may cause significant problems when
it comes to combating eminent domain abuse in a manner that might
result in effective deterrence. The Texas Rice Land Partners
decision itself was backlash against pipeline companies who abuse
eminent domain; however, pipeline companies will not be deterred
if landowners fail to challenge the TRC. Without a challenge, no
evidence of wrongdoing can be revealed. One potential avenue for
challenging these companies is liability for fraud during the
common carrier application process.151 However, further scrutiny of
148. See id. at § 32.46(b).
149. See id.
150. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.01(1) (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).
151. See Charles Richards, TransCanada wins OK to proceed with pipeline
through Lamar County, EPARISEXTRA! (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.eparisextra
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the Texas Rice Land Partners decision within the context of
evaluating the crime of securing a document through deception will
reveal this task is not as simple as practitioners and activists might
imagine.
A. Analyzing a Case of Fraud In Light of Denbury
For the offense of securing execution of a document through
deception, the act must be perpetrated with specific intent to defraud
or harm any person and must cause another to sign or execute any
document.152 The reasonable probability standard set forth by the
court in Denbury makes a determination of common carrier status
extremely challenging.153 The uncertainty the case presents becomes
quite apparent, especially considering the possibility of fraud during
the T-4 application.
In other words, for there to be a basis for deception, there must
first be a clear rule that articulates the proper manner in which one
must evaluate the information sworn as correct on an application.154
For example, in Forkert v. Texas, the defendant applied for
Medicaid and food stamps.155 Her applications were approved, and
she received $6,450 in benefits.156 The maximum amount of
household resources an applicant may have in order to qualify for
Medicaid and food stamps is $2,000.157 After an applicant submits
their paperwork, a Texas Department of Human Services (DHS)
caseworker conducts a follow-up interview so that the information

.com/paris-texas-news/2012/08/23/transcanada-wins-ok-to-proceed-with-pipelinethrough-lamar-county/50123 [http://perma.cc/AQ7E-QHA9] (archived Feb. 25,
2014) (referring to Judge Bill Harris’ statement that he found no fraud or
wrongdoing on TransCanada’s part).
152. Id.
153. See supra Part II.B.1. (discussing difficulties which are likely to arise
from the decision).
154. In other words, the application needs to require specific information that
provides the reviewer of the application a basis from which the accuracy of the
information provided may be determined. See, e.g., Forkert v. State, No. 08-0500224-CR, 2007 WL 2682972 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2007) (holding that
defendant was guilty of crime of securing execution of a document through
deception because she intentionally stated that she had $0 in household resources
on application for food stamps where qualification for assistance required that she
not have more than $2000 in resources and defendant had resources greater than
this amount).
155. Forkert, 2007 WL 2682972, at *1.
156. Id.
157. See id.
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provided on the application can be verified.158 The caseworker then
submits the applicant's information for processing.159
After review, it was determined that Mrs. Forkert failed to
disclose the existence of two accounts to DHS during the application
stage, one of which had a balance of approximately $58,000.160
However, on the defendant’s original application, she claimed that,
between those who live with her, she had $0 in cash.161 While the
defendant did not have direct access to the accounts, her husband,
who lived at the same residence, did, and the household benefited
from the account.162 The court found that there was sufficient
evidence to convict Mrs. Forkert of securing the execution of a
document by deception because DHS relied on deceptive
information to determine that she qualified for benefits, and she
intentionally provided that false information.163
There is a notable difference between the situation illustrated
above and a situation in which a pipeline company could be
prosecuted for fraud. In a situation where one fraudulently applies
for Medicaid, there are two primary parties involved. Person A
(applicant) lies and causes person B (state government) to execute a
document, which harms person B’s pecuniary interest.164 During the
T-4 application process, however, it would be Person A (pipeline
company) that provides deceptive information, causing person B
(TRC) to execute the T-4 application conferring common carrier
status. However, there is a third person involved in this situation; it
is person C (the landowner) whose pecuniary interest would be
affected.
Nevertheless, the statute states that the deception must be
perpetrated with specific intent to defraud or harm any person and
must cause another to sign or execute any document.165 Based on a
plain reading of the statute, as required by Texas methods of
statutory interpretation, prosecution of the pipeline corporation
would still be possible despite the fact that there is an intermediary
between the deceptive applicant and the person whose pecuniary
interest is affected.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Forkert, 2007 WL 2682972, at *2.
162. See id.
163. See id. at *6.
164. Recall that affecting the pecuniary interest of a person or entity is an
essential element of securing a document by deception. See supra Part III
(discussing the elements of fraud).
165. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.46 (West 2011 & Supp. 2013).
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While criminal liability is desirable in light of other failed
methods of deterrence,166 it is likely unattainable with the current
state of determining common carrier status set forth in Texas Rice
Land Partners. If a pipeline company filled out a T-4 application,
and it was later shown that the company intentionally provided
deceptive information on the application, there would probably be a
basis for prosecution.167 However, the problem rests on the
company’s intent. The deception would be based on a finding that
the company checked the common carrier box when, in fact, the
company knew it was not a common carrier. In order to prove that
the company knew it was not a common carrier, the government
must demonstrate that the company knew that it would be operating
the pipeline privately. Several problems arise in carrying this burden
of proof.
The Texas Rice Land Partners decision seems to be out of touch
with the historical definition of public use in Texas. The court in
Texas Rice Land Partners makes clear that reasonable certainty of
public use “at some point after construction” is required.168
However, further into the opinion, the court declined to find that the
pipeline would be made available to the public “at some point after
construction” when Denbury presented evidence that there was a
“possibility” that it would be “transporting other people’s CO2 in the
future.”169 The court stated that this evidence was insufficient to
prove a reasonable certainty because the person who presented the
testimony failed to “identify any possible customers and was
unaware of any other entity unaffiliated with Denbury Green that
owned CO2 near the pipeline route in Louisiana and Mississippi.”170
The court’s use of the language, “at some point,” seems to
indicate that it is willing to allow pipeline companies to satisfy the
bar for common carrier status even if the other users are not
identified at the time of application.171 However, the court’s
reasoning abandons this position; namely, the court’s reasoning
requires that there be definitive evidence presented at the time of a
common carrier status challenge regarding those companies (or
consumers) that will use the pipeline in the future.172
166. See supra Part I.C.2. (discussing other ineffective methods of deterrence).
167. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.46.
168. See Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas,
LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. 2012), reh’g denied, 381 S.W.3d 465 (Tex.
2012).
169. Id. at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Id.
171. See id. at 202.
172. By refusing to accept evidence presented by Denbury Green of the
possibility that the pipeline would transport “other people’s CO2 in the future” as

332

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. 2

The court in Texas Rice Land Partners fails to recognize that
there are several reasons why a company may initially seek to
construct a pipeline, yet fail to identify outside users or consumers at
the time immediately prior to construction, or those who would use
the pipeline for hire thereby establishing its public use status. In its
decision, the court seems to ignore a fairly obvious fact regarding
the timing of a landowner’s potential challenge: the challenge occurs
very early in the pipeline project process—before the route is
finalized and often before commercial agreements with customers
and/or shippers are consummated.173 This is the stage where
challenges to the power of eminent domain are most frequently
asserted.174
Landowners generally would like to prevent construction of a
pipeline prior to its commencement, rather than after condemnation
proceedings have already started. Therefore, the challenge is likely
to occur shortly after common carrier status is conferred but before
the pipeline company has identified actual consumers or before it
has any tangible agreements for “public use for hire.” This makes it
extremely unlikely that a pipeline owner will be able to identify
other possible consumers with actual and definitive evidence, as the
court in Texas Rice Land Partners requires. An advocate for
landowners may initially believe this to be beneficial for the
landowners. While this may be true for a single landowner in an
isolated situation, such a result is not good for the overall objective
of deterring widespread eminent domain abuse because an
underdeveloped standard allows pipeline companies wiggle room in
the event they are stretching the truth on a T-4 application.
There will likely be much disagreement over the application of
Texas Rice Land Partners as time progresses.175 The Texas Rice
Land Partners court stated that the decision was limited to the issue
presented, only as it pertained to carbon dioxide pipelines, and that it
was making no ruling on the interpretation of the remaining sections

proof that the pipeline would be made to the public “at some point after
construction, ” the court appears to be requiring something greater in order to meet
it’s reasonable certainty standard (i.e., closer to definitive evidence).
173. Kenneth E. McKay, CLE Presentation at the University of Texas School
of Law: The Denbury Decision: What it Says, What it Doesn’t Say & What
People Say it Says (August 23–24, 2012), available at http://www.lockelord
.com/files/News/c69e59db-f7e6-4d6b-acd8-25e804a9d132/Presentation/NewsAtta
chment/738ed5a3-9ad3-4204-86b8-2741c22329ea/McKay%20Denbury%20Paper
.pdf [http://perma.cc/S3HL-8QM7] (archived Feb. 25, 2014).
174. Id. (assuming that a landowner actually asserts a challenge).
175. Id. (discussing the likelihood that interpretations of Texas Rice Land
Partners decision will vary).
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of the Natural Resources Code dealing with common carrier
status.176 The result will undoubtedly be an inconsistent application
of the common carrier status standard set forth by the Texas Rice
Land Partners court. If courts are inconsistent in determining what
qualifies as reasonable certainty, how can pipeline companies truly
be found to be guilty of fraudulent conduct through deception?
In a situation where one applies for Medicaid, there is a clear
rule articulated: an applicant can have no more than $2,000 in
resources per household.177 The same cannot be said regarding
common carrier status because the Court in Texas Rice Land
Partners failed to state what evidence would satisfy the burden of
proving that a company is a common carrier. If the court did this
there would be a clear rule, and any pipeline company that filled out
a T-4 application stating it was a common carrier, knowing it did not
meet the requirements for common carrier status laid out by the
court—perhaps hoping that no landowner would challenge its
common carrier status and thereby avoiding the production of
evidence proving it was in fact a common carrier—would be subject
to criminal prosecution.
An example of the conflicting interpretation issue can be seen in
a recent decision issued by a Lamar County judge regarding the
Keystone pipeline.178 The judge in that case declined to apply Texas
Rice Land Partners although the landowner challenging eminent
domain strongly argued that the case applied.179 While a pipeline
that has national implications is significantly different from one that
may have only local implications, the point remains that the
possibility for inconsistent application of Texas Rice Land Partners’
reasonable certainty standard presents a significant hurdle for what
may be one of the only remaining methods of deterring pipeline
companies in Texas from engaging in eminent domain abuse. The
Texas Rice Land Partners decision, while well intended, may
actually limit one of the few methods available to combat eminent
domain abuse: criminal liability for fraud.
IV. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
While deception is the key to guilt for the crime of fraud, the
Texas Rice Land Partners’ decision and its reasonable certainty
176. See Texas Rice Land Partners, 363 S.W.3d at 202 n.28.
177. Forkert v. State, 2007 WL 2682972, at *1.
178. See generally Saul Elbein, Judge Upholds Eminent Domain for Pipeline
in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, at A16.
179. Id. (noting that the Lamar County Court judge issued only a 15-word
ruling from his iPhone addressing counsels’ motions).
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standard makes such a finding extremely difficult and only further
complicates the matter of eminent domain abuse. Since the Texas
Rice Land Partners decision was limited to carbon dioxide
pipelines, criminal liability in situations in which eminent domain
abuse is most likely to occur is probably not possible. Eminent
domain abuse will generally occur when pipelines with a greater
economic benefit are to be constructed. These pipelines include
those such as crude oil and natural gas.180
Although there is support from the Texas Rice Land Partners
decision expressing that its ruling should not be applied beyond the
scope of carbon dioxide pipelines,181 there is sufficient reason to
support application of the standard to other types of pipelines. In
fact, litigants in Texas have begun to present arguments that the
standard should be applied broadly.182 Applying the standard
broadly ensures that, when a bright line rule for what is sufficient to
establish oneself as a common carrier is articulated, the possibility
of fraud for running astray of this standard will extend to all
pipelines, especially those which have the greatest incentive to
abuse the power of eminent domain.183 The problem is actually
articulating a rule.
Once a rule is established, the application process needs to be
revisited. The power to determine common carrier status cannot be
left in the hands of the TRC. While landowners currently have the
power to challenge common carrier status, they are still unlikely to
do so with much frequency.184 Consequently, evidence that would
uncover fraudulent behavior is unlikely to come to light with enough
frequency to effectuate deterrence, even if a few landowners do
challenge a company’s status. The incentive to game the system will
still be great for most pipeline companies because the likelihood of
detection will remain relatively low. Hence, even with a rule laying
out precisely what will suffice to establish oneself as a common
carrier, the process of review will need to be revamped.
180. See The World’s 25 Biggest Oil Companies, FORBES, www.forbes.com
/pictures/mef45glfe/not-just-the-usual-suspects-2/ [http://perma.cc/957B-KHJ4]
(archived Feb. 25, 2014) (featuring mostly crude oil and natural gas companies. It is
reasonable to infer that many of the most profitable pipelines are those that are
constructed for the purpose of exploring for crude oil or natural gas.).
181. In fact, the court expressly states so in the decision.
182. See Texas Rice Land Partners, Ltd. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas,
LLC, 381 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tex. 2012) (on motion for reh’g).
183. See supra Part I.C.1. (discussing the history of oil and gas in Texas, the
importance of oil and gas to the Texas economy, and the political support behind
oil and gas exploration in Texas). See also Elbein, supra note 178.
184. See supra Part I.C.2. (discussing reasons why landowners are seldom
likely to challenge common carrier status).
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Requiring a pipeline company seeking common carrier status to
apply before the court is a much more effective standard. The
process of filling out the application with the TRC may remain, but
courts should be granted power beyond a mere cursory check, even
if a landowner does not challenge the common carrier status. In fact,
these checks should be random.185 However, requiring courts to
simply check whether or not a pipeline company has agreed to be
governed by the TRC is merely a perpetuation of the problem. The
incentive for those in political power to protect pipeline companies
known not to be common carriers it far too great. The system in
place is designed to protect pipeline companies that are not actually
common carriers and therefore should not have the power of
eminent domain. Those in power are likely well aware of the low
percentage of landowners who will actually challenge a pipeline
company’s status. The situation is being taken advantage of for the
sake of economic gain and it should be allowed no longer.
If the legislature grants courts the power to go beyond a mere
cursory check and require a substantive evaluation of a company’s
compliance with public use requirements by determining what
evidence will support a finding that a company is a common carrier,
pipeline companies will no longer be able to manipulate the system.
This will almost immediately deter fraudulent behavior. The
legislature may, however, refuse to grant courts this power at the
beginning of the common carrier process. But once a rule for
determining common carrier status has been developed, eminent
domain abuse can still be curbed.
CONCLUSION
Eminent domain abuse, as it relates to pipeline companies and
the TRC, is a serious problem in Texas. The political influence of oil
and gas companies has resulted in legislation that is meant to give
pipeline companies every advantage possible during the common
carrier application process. Couple this with the strong incentive to
defraud landowners, and what remains is a system that allows
pipeline companies to manipulate the system for private gain. While
the Texas Rice Land Partners decision made an attempt to help
landowners, it may have resulted in more harm than good by
making one of the few remaining methods of deterring eminent
domain abuse (criminal liability) difficult to achieve. Legislative
protections are desirable, but the potential for political influence
185. This is assuming the numbers of T-4 applications filed each year are so
numerous that requiring review of each individual application would place too
great of a burden on the Texas courts.
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from the oil and gas companies makes it unlikely that any legislative
changes to deter pipeline companies from engaging in fraudulent
practices will be implemented.
Sending a strong message to pipeline companies that fraudulent
practices will result in criminal liability is the best way to deter these
companies from engaging in fraudulent practices. In order for this to
happen, however, significant changes need to be made in the review
process regarding the determination of which companies are, and
which companies are not, common carriers. The power of eminent
domain is absolutely necessary to the continuing growth of the
Texas economy; however, when the scales are unjustly tipped in the
favor of pipeline companies, the line between public use and private
gain become blurred.
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